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NOTES
Copyright: Computer Firmware: Is It Copyrightable?*
The copyrightability of firmware, particularly Read Only Memories, is
somewhat in doubt. This note deals with some recent legal problems that have
developed with the advancement of computer technology. More specifically,
it deals with the copyrightability of a type of computer firmware (computer
chips) known as Read Only Memories (ROMs).' Because a ROM represents
a form of storage medium different from that which has previously been encountered, it has brought the confusion typical of many new concepts. Much
of this confusion arises from the terms used and from a lack of understanding
of what a ROM is and what it does. This note attempts to clarify the confusion that exists in this area and to show that ROMs are simply a tangible
medium of expression in which the original work (here a computer program)
is fixed. Because the copyrightability of a ROM is so closely tied to that of
computer programs, this note begins .by reviewing the status of copyrightability
of computer programs.
General Copyright Protectionfor Software
Copyright protection, as a general principle, subsists in original works of
authorship that Congress has chosen to include within the scope of the
copyright laws.2 The power of Congress to authorize such protection is derived
from the United States Constitution. 3 Congress' intent to extend copyright
protection to computer programs is evident from legislative history" and recent statutory enactment.$
The legislative history6 of the Copyright Act of 1976" is explicit: computer
programs are to "be regarded as an extension of copyrightable subject matter

* This note was originally entered in the 1982 Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition, sponsored by the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, under the title of "Recent
Developments in Copyright Law Concerning Computer Firmware."-Ed.
1. ROM is a general class that includes PROM (Programable Read Only Memory); EPROM
(Erasable Programable Read Only Memory); and EEPROM (Electrically Erasable Programable
Read Only Memory).
2. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (Supp. IV 1980).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,cl.8 which states: "The Congress shall have power to promote
the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors
the exclusive rights to their respective writings and discoveries."
4. H.R. RP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1976) reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 5659 [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT].
5. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-117 (Supp. IV 1980).
6. HousE REPORT, supra note 4.
7. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976).
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Congress had already intended to protect. . ."I". In a House Report prepared
for Congress, looking into current developments in the copyright laws, it was
concluded that computer programs were copyrightable from the outset, without
need for new legislation." This congressional intent can also be implied from
the Copyright Revision Act of 1976,10 which provides that works capable of
being communicated with the aid of a machine are within the scope of
copyrightable subject matter." Under the Computer Software Act of 1980,12
the definition of a computer program'" was added to the Copyright Act of
1976. Furthermore, the old section 117, which specifically prevented the new
Act from changing the copyright law as to computer programs, was repealed
and replaced with new section 117," which limits the extent of copyright protection in computer programs. Since the new section 117 limits the copyright
protection afforded computer programs, exclusive rights for computer programs must exist under the Copyright Act.
The fact that computer programs may be protected by copyright does not
mean that all programs are so protected; they still must satisfy the statutory
requisites for protection.' 5 One of these requirements is that a work (here
a program) must be original in its expression before it will be afforded
copyright protection.' 6 It is important to note that "original" means created
by the author, as opposed to copied. Thus, a program protected by copyright
does not have to be new, and in fact can be precisely the same as another's
earlier program, if it is created by the author and not copied. Moreover, new
expressions (e.g., rewritten programs) of old ideas or even copied ideas (e.g.,
algorithms for moving a dot on a television screen) are protected because
copyright protects original expressions, as opposed to ideas. Therefore, many
variations of a basic program idea that produce the same result are capable
7
of separate copyright protection.
In addition to the originality requirement, a computer program must be
fixed in a tangible medium of expression from which it can be perceived for

8. HousE

REPORT,

supra note 4, at 5664.

9. Id. This indicates that Congress believed that prior to the 1976 Copyright Act, computer
programs were protected under the 1909 Copyright Act.

10. See L. GASAVAY & M. MURPHY, LEGAL
[hereinafter cited as GASAWAY & MURPHY).

PROTECTION FOR COMPUTER PROGRAMS

14 (1976)

11. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1976): "Copyright protection subsists, in
accordance with this title [17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976)], in original works of authorship fixed

in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from which they can
be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with aid of a machine
or device. .. ."
12. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (Supp. IV 1980).
13. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. IV 1980) defines a computer program as "a set of statements

or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain
result."
14. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (Supp. IV 1980).
15. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (Supp. IV 1980).
16. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (Supp. IV 1980).
17. GASAWAY & MURPHY, supra note 10, at 15-16.
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more than a transitory period of time. 8 A computer program may be fixed
in a variety of different media, such as printed form, punched cards, magnetic
tape, silicon chips,' 9 or bubble memories.2"
If a program meets the requirements of originality and fixation, it is capable
of protection by copyright. To maintain the protection, notice of the copyright
must be placed on the program. This notice consists of the copyright symbol
(©),together with the year of first publication and the name of the copyright
owner. 2' This notice informs the public that the program is protected, who
the owner is, and when protection is likely to end.
Registration of the program with the Copyright Office is not required before
the copyright protection will apply; it can be made at any time during the
life of the copyright. 2 Registration prior to infringement, however, is a
necessity for certain legal remedies, such as statutory damages and attorney's
fees. 3
To obtain registration, a copy or copies of the work, together with a completed application form and the copyright fee, must be deposited with the
Library of Congress.24 For computer programs, an "identifying portion" of
the program may be deposited in lieu of the entire work. An identifying portion is either the first and last 25 pages or the equivalent units of the program, if reproduced on paper."s If the applications and deposits are proper,
a Certificate of Registration will be issued. Programs meeting these requisites
are afforded copyright protection. The law is fairly well settled in this area,
as evidenced by the new section 117.
Firmware Terminology
"Firmware" is relatively new term developed to fill a void created with
the development of integrated circuit (I.C.) chips. These I.C. chips are solid
small pieces, often made of silicon, into which several active and/or passive
components have been integrated so that the piece performs the function of
a circuit. 26 A number of the I.C. chips may be placed on a board, which
is referred to as a printed circuit (P.C.) board.

18. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. IV 1980) defines a work as being fixed when, "its embodiment
in a copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent
or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of
more than transitory duration."
19. Integrated circuits are often referred to as silicon chips.
20. Bubble memories store data in very small regions of reversed magnetization in garnet
that appear as bubble-like disks when viewed under polarized light. See Lin & Sanders, ContiguousElement Memories Increase Storage Tenfold, I.E.E.E. SPECTRUM 30 (Feb. 1981).
21. 17 U;S.C. § 401(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
22. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (Supp. IV 1980). Note that registration is a prerequisite to enforcing
the copyright in federal court. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (1976).
23. 17 U.S.C. § 504 (Supp. IV 1980).
24. 17 U.S.C. § 407 (Supp. IV 1980).
25. Id.
26. C. SUSSKINrD, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OP ELECTRONics 380 (1962).
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When the I.C. chips were developed, they did not fit the conventional meaning of hardware (the computer machinery itself) or software (the actual program used to instruct the computer). Thus, a third term, firmware, was
developed for I.C. chips. A ROM falls into this category.
A ROM2" is a storage medium for electronically coded machine readable
words.2" These machine readable words are usually a set of steps, or instructions, that are "burned," or permanently encoded, into the ROM, and which
normally may not be altered. 29 A ROM is considered to be a nonvolatile storage
device, which means that when the computer power is turned off, the ROM
will retain the machine readable information stored in it.1
A ROM is used to store computer instructions or information in the form
of computer words. These computer words are made up of binary digits.2'
A binary digit has only two values or states, off (0) and on (1). Binary digits
are commonly referred to as "bits." In a computer word, there 33are normally
eight bits, 32 and these eight-bit words are known as "bytes."
The term normally used in cases dealing with ROMs is "object code," which
is a program that has been converted into machine readable words, or bytes,
that are a series of O's and l's that are stored in the ROM. Another commonly
used term for object code is "machine language."
Because an object code was difficult to read and took a great deal of time
to input into a computer, shorter forms were developed. One of these forms,
"assembly language," 3 is a series of mnemonic instructions that may be used
instead of the object code. 3 Each assembly language instruction corresponds
one-to-one with a machine language, or object code, instruction. 36 Although
copyright protection for ROMs is a question closely tied to that of protection
for computer software, it does present a different question.
27. An example of a ROM is the Intel 8355 ROM. This is normally considered an LSI
chip that will hold up to 2,048 computer readable words, or bytes. LSI stands for Large Scale
Integration and is usually a chip that contains between 100 and 1,000 gates. MCST-85 USER'S
MANuAL 5-35 (SEPT. 1978).
28. R. KRurz, MICROPROCESSORS AND LOGIC DESIGN 5 (1980) [hereinafter cited as KRUTZ].
29. Id.
30. Id. An example of a volatile storage device is one such as those found in hand-held
calculators. When the calculator is turned off, the information in the memory is erased. See
also Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman, "669 F.2d 852, 854 (2d Cir. 1982).
31. MCSTM USER'S MiuAL 5-35. (Sept. 1978). Binary digits are written in base two (102
= 2,,; 11, = 3,,). This comes from Boolean algebra, developed by George Boole.
32. For example, 10110010 is a computer word (10110010 [Base 2] = 178 [Base 10] if a
number). This number written in Base 2 could have stood for an instruction, such as "add the
number in the X register to the number in the Y register."
33. KRtrrZ, supra note 28, at 4; half a byte (or four bits) is referred to as a nibble.
34. There are many other forms, such as BASIC, FORTRAN, and COBOL.
35. KRuTz, supra note 28, at 269, Ex. ADD, SUB, MOV.
36. For example, ADD C is equivalent to 10000001; MOV C,D is equivalent to 01001010
(see 8080/85 CPU Instruction by INTEL® at A-5). The manner in which this works is that
the programmer enters on the screen the instruction in Assembly Language. The instruction is
then translated in a compiler, which is a program that translates a program written in a higher
level language (such as FORTRAN, BASIC, or Assembler Language) into machine readable
language.
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Cases

There have been only a few cases directly dealing with copyright protection
37
for the ROMs or object code. These cases have conflicting and diverse results,
which are discussed below.
The White-Smith Case
Many recent cases dealing with computer firmware have been influenced
by the 1908 decision in White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.,31
where the Supreme Court found that perforated piano rolls used in player
pianos were not copyrightable. An action was brought to restrain infringement of the copyright of two musical compositions published in the form
of sheet music. 39 The majority opinion indicated that because these perforated
rolls of paper formed part of the machine and were not made to address
the eye, as sheet music was, they were not copies of the work.40 This reasoning, while partly sound, conflicts with the Court's later statement that "[a]ny
mode of copying such a thing (sheet music) whether by printing, writing,
photography, or by some other method not yet invented, would no doubt
be copying."' The Court continued, saying that the perforated rolls might
be considered copies if they could be sung or played from (of which some
evidence had been entered to show that they could be), but because the rolls
were to be used in a machine as part of the mechanism, they would not be
considered copies.4 2 In a concurring opinion, Justice Holmes was more on
point, stating that a person qualified for copyright protection by inventing
a new collocation of visible or audible points.4 3 This theory restricts others
from using the specific form of the devised collocation and would extend protection to what was its essence44 : "A musical composition is a rational collocation of sounds apart from concepts, reduced to a tangible expression from
which the collocation can be reproduced either with or without continuous
human intervention."" Justice Holmes continued: "On principle anything that
mechanically reproduces that collocation of sounds ought to be held a copy,"' ,
37. In the earliest case, Data Cash Sytems, Inc. v. J.S. & A. Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp.
1063 (N.D. Ill. 1979), the court held that direct copying of a ROM's object code was not a
copyright infringement. In more recent cases, Midway Mfg. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466
(D. Neb. 1981), Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal.
1981), and Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982), courts have held
that the object code, and the ROM, were protected. In another decision, the question was put
off because of complexity. Certain Coin-Operated Audio-Visual Games & Components Thereof,
2 CoPYRiGHT L. REP. (CCH) 25, 229 at 16,672 (Int'l Trade Comm'n Investigative Report,
June 25, 1981).
38. 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
39. Id. at 8.
40. Id. at 12.
41. Id. at 14 (emphasis added).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 19 (Holmes, J., concurring).
44. Id.

45. Id. at 20.
46. Id.
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or if the copyright statute is too narrow, it should be amended to cover this
type of infringement., 7 Congress, however, did not follow this theory and
adopted the majority's definition making a statutory exception for piano rolls.'
The White-Smith standard remained in effect until the 1976 Act. 49 The
legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976 indicates that computer programs would have been protected by copyright law even before 1976.0 The
original section 11751 stated that computer programs were to be treated the
same as they were treated prior to the 1976 Act, which, following the WhiteSmith legacy, would have denied protection to anything not readable with
the human eye (such as a ROM). In 1980 the original section 117 was replaced
by a new section 117,52 ending the White-Smith legacy for computer programs.

The new section 117 indicates that computer programs have the same protection available as any other copyrightable work, with certain special limita53
tions.
The Midway Case
In the case of Midway Manufacturing v. Dirkschneider,5 4 the plaintiff obtained copyright registrations for several video games (Galaxian, Pac-Man,
and Rally-X) by submitting video tapes (not computer programs) of the games'
play" and attract1 6 modes. When the defendant began manufacturing,
distributing, and selling identical games, the plaintiff alleged copyright infringement and unfair competition." The district court issued a temporary
restraining order, which was followed by a preliminary injunction.5
In Midway the court's discussion centered on copyright protection for programmable Read Only Memories (PROMs), which, for the purposes of this
paper, can be considered to be the same as ROMs." The court concluded that:
Under these statutory provisions, it is clear that the plaintiff's
audiovisual works are fixed in the printed circuit boards. The
printed circuit boards are tangible objects from which the
47. Id.
48. Copyright Act, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).

49. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (Supp. IV 1980).
50. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 4, at 5664.
51. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1976).
52. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (Supp. IV 1980).
53. Id.

54. 543 F. Supp. 466 (D. Neb. 1981).
55. The play mode commences once a coin is inserted in the machine and the player begins
operating the controls. Certain Coin-Operated Audio-Visual Games & Components Thereof, 2
COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) '1 25,299 at 16,672 (Int'l Trade Comm'n Investigative Report, June

25, 1981).
56. The attract mode is a short sequence of images designed to attract potential players to
a game. It is displayed by the machine while not in use and normally consists of a short sequence
that continually repeats. Id.
57. Midway Mfg. V. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466, 473 (D. Neb. 1981).
58. Id.

59. Id., where the court defined PROM as including ROMs, PROMs and EPROMs.
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audiovisual works may be perceived for a period of time more than
transitory. The fact that the audiovisual works cannot be viewed
without a machine does not mean the works are not fixed. The
court therefore is of the opinion that the plaintiff's audiovisual
works are fixed, and thus may be copyrighted."0
In reaching this decision the court took a two-step approach. First, it looked
at whether the works constituted copyrightable subject matter, and second,
whether the work was fixed.6 ' The court found that the work was properly
considered an audiovisual work."2 This reasoning, however, does not apply
to object code programs because this expression in the program is different
from the expression in the video image. Thus, this program has an
expression-its computer words-that can be read by a computer programmer; it also can produce an expression on the video screen. Interestingly, one
video expression results entirely from the program (the attract mode) and the
other results from an interaction between the program and a player (the play
mode). Each audiovisual result of the play mode is, for all practical purposes,
unique because no two players will react the same. While these different modes
are important in video game cases to determine copyright protection for the
display, many ROMs operate internally in a manner that does not produce
a display on a video screen. One such internal operation, which was discussed
in Tandy Corp. v. PersonalMicro Computers, Inc.,63 is the translation of
a higher program language form into a machine readable object code.
While the Midway court found that the work fell into the category of
audiovisual works, and while computer programs" have also been considered
literary works, 65 such categorization is not necessary. The categories of works
enumerated in the statute 6 are to be used as examples and are not intended
to be all-inclusive. 67 Accordingly, the real test applied when a work is placed
in such a category is whether it is an original work of authorship.6 8
As for the second question concerning fixation, the Midway court's reasoning
would apply for all ROMs:
The act provides that copyright protection may be obtained "in

60. Id. at 479.
61. Id.
62. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(6) (Supp. IV 1980). This was because a visual copy of the attract
and play modes had been registered.
63. 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981). See notes 100-115, infra, and accompanying text.
64. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. IV 1980) defines a computer program as a set of statements
or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer to bring about certain results.
65. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). The proposed amendment by the Software Protection Committee would change this section to read "literary works, including computer programs," rather than just "literary works."
66. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1-7) (Supp. IV 1980).
67. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. IV 1980). The term "includes" in § 102(a) is illustrative and
not limitative.
68. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
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original works of authorship fixed 69 in any tangible medium of
expression, now known or later developed, from which they can
be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either
directly or with the aid of a machine or device." 17 USC 102(a)'
Because a ROM cannot be erased (is involatile), it fits the definition of
"fixed"'" and is a tangible medium under the Act."' Thus, the object code
contained in the ROM, and the ROM itself, is subject matter protected by
the copyright laws 3 because the ROM would be considered part of the P.C.
board discussed in the court's decision.
The Data Cash Case
In Daia-CashSystems, Inc. v. J.S. & A. Group, Inc., the plaintiff, through
an independent consultant, designed and developed a computer program for
a hand-held computerized chess game, Compu Chess.7 The plaintiff began
marketing the Compu Chess game without the copyright notice appearing on
the game or on its packaging.' 6 Apparently, the plaintiff was not concerned
about copying and incorrectly believed its program could not be read from
the ROM chip once it had been programmed and placed in the game. Such
programs are capable of being read from a ROM, which the defendant must
77
have done, because his ROM was identical to the plaintiff's.
In Data Cash, the district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, reasoning that a ROM was not a "copy" under the copyright
law; therefore, the reproduction of the ROM was not an infringement .' The
question of whether a ROM was capable of being copyrighted was raised by
the court on its own motion.' This may partially explain some incorrect
statements in the opinion. For example, in describing the steps of programming
a computer, the court stated:
The first phase is the development of a flow chart which is a
schematic representation of the program's logic. It sets forth the
logical steps involved in solving a given problem. The second phase
is the development of a "source program" which is a translation
of the flow chart into computer programming language, such as
FORTRAN or COBOL." Source programs may be punched on

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. IV 1980). See supra text at note 19.
Midway Mfg. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466, 480 (D. Neb. 1981).
17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. IV 1980).
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
Midway Mfg. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466, 480 (D. Neb. 1981).
480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. II1.1979), aff'd on other grounds 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980).
480 F. Supp. 1063, 1065 (N.D. I1l. 1979).
Id. at 1066.
Id.
Id. at 1041.
Id.
This would also include the above mentioned Assembly Language.
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a deck of cards or imprinted on disks, tapes or drums. The third
phase is the development of an "assembly program" which is a
translation of the programming language into machine readable
computer language. Unlike source programs, which are readable
by trained programmers, assembly programs are virtually unintelligible except by the computer itself. Finally, the fourth phase
is the development of an "object program" which is a conversion
of the machine language into a device commanding a series of electrical impulses."
The first two phases described above are correct, but the latter two phases
are not literally correct. Once the flow chart has been put into programming
language 2 (step two, above), the result is normally input into a computer.
The computer almost always has a compiler program that translates this into
object code. This translation program is then transferred into a storage
medium,8 3 which may be in the form of either a punched card or tape, a
hard or floppy disk, or a ROM." ' The terminology used by the court in the
fourth phase incorrectly indicates that an object program does not exist prior
to having the program placed into the storage device. The object program
can exist without being placed in a storage medium. In fact, it can be printed
out or written on paper by the computer or a programmer. The storage device
is simply a type of tangible medium of expression.8" In actuality, there are
only three phases of compiling a program: the flow chart, the source program, and the object program. In Data Cash the appellate court, rather than
6
the district court, recited the correct steps.1
81. Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. J.S. & A. Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. 111.1979).
82. Here, Assembly Language is used as an example.
83. In some computers, without the aid of a compiler, the hexadecimal number must be
entered directly.
84. For example, if one takes the number that is stored in register, or memory, A, and adds
one to it, a flow chart would have a step similar to this.

The second phase would have an instruction such as:
INR A
or
3C
(the corresponding hex number)
From here the third phase would convert, by means of a compiler, the instructions into a
machine readable object code of O's and l's.
INR A or 3C is converted
to 00111100 object code
The fourth phase would then store the object code in some type of storage medium (such
as a ROM).
85. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (Supp. IV 1980).
86. Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. J.S. & A. Group, Inc., 628 F.2d 1038, 1040 (7th Cir. 1980):
Initially, the programmer develops a "flow chart", a schematic representation of
the program logic. The next step is to render those instructions into a "source
code", a programming language such as FORTRAN or COBOL. The source pro-
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The district court also stated: "[A]ssembly programs"7 are virtually unintelligible except by the computer itself. . . ."18 This also appears to be in
doubt. Although the machine language would take some time to translate
into English, it would take no longer than to translate something from a French
or German dictionary.
Another puzzling statement was made by the district court: "The source
program is a writing while the object program is a mechanical tool or machine
part." 8 9 This also is incorrect because the object code is not the ROM itself,
but is stored in the ROM, much the same way it could be stored on a magnetic
storage disk. While a ROM physically appears to be a mechanical part, it
is no more mechanical than a magnetic storage disk or a phonograph record.
The court further stated that, "Object programs, which enter into the
mechanical process itself, cannot be read without the aid of special equipment and cannot be understood by even the most highly trained programmers." 9 This is incorrect because, as previously stated, object code can be
written and understood by programmers. In addition, because a ROM is a
copy of a program, 9' which is capable of being read with the aid of special
machines, it may properly be considered a copy as defined by the Copyright
Act.9 2 If a copy "includes the material object ... in which the work is first
fixed," 9 then a ROM may be properly considered a copyrightable work and
entitled to protection. The district court, as a result of its incorrect reasoning
that the object code in the ROM is a mechanical device, did not agree that
a ROM is a copy.94
Another argument made by the court is that since the ROM "is not in
a form which one can 'see and read' with the naked eye, it is not a 'copy'
within the meaning of the 1909 Act." ' The court cites the piano roll case,
White-Smith, 95 in support of this. In an earlier Texas district court case,97
gram is then translated into an assembly language or machine language, a series
of "ones" and "zeroes". Finally, the program is stored in some mechanical medium
such as magnetic tape or disk. In this case the medium was in the form of ReadOnly-Memory (ROM).
87. The object code, or machine language, of O's and I's.
88. Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. J.S. & A. Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ill.
1979).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. IV 1980), the term "copy" is defined as:
[a material object] . . .in which a work is fixed by any method now known or
later developed, and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of machine or device. The term
'copies' include the material object, other than a phonorecord, in which the work
is first fixed.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. J.S. & A. Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063, 1066-67 (N.D.
Ill. 1979).
95. Id. at 1069.
96. White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
97. Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex.
1978).
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however, that court stated that the "writings of an author need not be 'tangible
to the human eye'," 98 citing the United States Supreme Court decision in
99
which seems to indicate that the reasoning in the
Goldstein v. California,
00
White-Smith case' is no longer valid.
On appeal, the Data Cash'0' case was affirmed on the grounds that the
plaintiffs had not properly included the copyright notice on the ROM. The
case is illustrative, however, of the problems caused* by a court's lack of
understanding of ROM technology.
The Tandy Case
One of the more recent cases on point is Tandy Corp. v. PersonalMicro
Computers, Inc.,1°2 in which the plaintiff had developed a program to be used
in its TRS-80 computer. The program told the computer how to take information in one computer language, input into it by an operator, and translate
that information into a more simplified machine language,' 0 3 which could be
stored and acted upon by the computer. 4 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant copied the program for use in his PMC-80 computer. 5 The defendant
filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the ROM in which the program
was stored was not a "copy" of the original computer program, and, therefore,
a ROM that is a copy of another ROM does not infringe the copyright of
7
the original computer program.'0 6 The court disagreed, denying the motion.
In Tandy th court held that a computer program was a work of original
9
authorship and was subject to copyright protection,' 9 and that a silicon chip'
was a tangible means of expression consistent with the copyright statute." '
The conclusion that a computer program is subject to copyright laws was
derived partly from legislative history."' The court indicated that computer
programs would have been protected prior to the 1976 Act." 2
The second conclusion, that a silicon chip (ROM) was a tangible medium
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 1013.
412 U.S. 546 (1973).
White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. J.S. & A. Group, Inc., 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980).
524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
That is, an object code. See supra note 34.
Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171, 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 175.
Id. at 173.
Silicon chips include ROMs.
Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171, 173 (N.D. Cal. 1981).

111. House REPORT, supra note 4.

112. Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171, 173 (N.D. Cal. 1981),
which states:
[T]he legislative history indicates that Congress understood that computer programs
were subject to copyright under the law as it existed prior to the 1976 Act as well
as under the new statute. See, e.g. House Report No. 1476. 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1976) at 51 reprinted in [19761 U.S. Code Cong. and Admin. News 5659, 5664.
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of expression, was reached in the same manner as the Midway case.", The
court held that it was evident from the statute that a ROM is a tangible medium
of expression." 4 This also is supported by the House Report, which states:
Under the bill it makes no difference what the form, manner or
medium of fixation may be-whether it is in words, numbers, notes,
sounds, pictures or any other graphic or symbolic indicia, whether
embodied in a physical object in written, printed, photographic,
sculptural, punched, magnetic, or other stable form, and whether
it is capable of perception directly or by means
of any machine
5'
or device "now known or later developed.""
The reasoning of the Tandy case,' that a computer program is a work
of authorship covered by copyright law (as evidenced by legislation and
legislative intent),, and-that a ROM is simply a tangible medium of expression
in which a derivative form of the computer program is fixed, is the appropriate
conclusion.
The Stern Electronics Case
In Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman,"1 7 the court affirmed the issuance
of an injunction prohibiting defendant's use of the trademark "Scramble,"
and ruled that repetitive sequences of substantial portions of sights and sounds
of a video game qualified for copyright protection.'" The plaintiff, who had
an exclusive license to distribute the game in North and South America, had
developed a video game in which different games could be played by
substituting different PROMs containing different programs. The game
marketed by the defendant was identical in sight and sound to that of the
plaintiff.'9
The defendant contended that the plaintiff was not entitled to secure a
copyright on the game because the audiovisual work was neither fixed in any
tangible medium of expression nor original within the meaning of the statute.20
Both of these contentions arose from the fact that the displayed images in
the play mode varied depending on the player's movements. The court held
that the memory devices' 2' satisfied the statutory requirements of a copy in
which the work is fixed.' 22 The court then addressed the question of coauthorship of the player and decided that because many aspects of the sights

113. Midway Mfg. v. Dirkschneider, 543 F. Supp. 466 (D. Neb. 1981). See supra text accompanying notes 52-71.
114. Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171, 173 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
115. HousE REPoRT, supra note 4, at 5665.
116. Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171, 173 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
117. 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982).
118. Id. at 856.
119. Id. at 854-55,
120. Id. at 855.
121. Such as ROMs, PROMs and EPROMs.
122. Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855 (2d Cir. 1982).
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and the sequence of appearance remained constant during each play, "the
repetition sequence of a substantial portion of the sights and sounds of the
game qualifies for copyright protection as an audio-visual work."', 23 The court
did not define what would be too insubstantial to warrant copyright protection, nor whether a repetitive sequence of images might contain so few particularized forms of expression as to be only an abstract idea.'
Other Cases
The ITC Decision
In a recent International Trade Commission (ITC) decision,' 25 the Commission found the attract mode copyrightable in a coin-operated video game.' 26
Midway Manufacturing filed a complaint under the Tariff Act,' 27 alleging
unauthorized importation of certain coin video games that infringed complainant's rights in his video game Galaxian. In finding infringement of the attract
mode, the court stated: "[Olur feelings do not extend to the copyrightability
of the Galaxian game itself, but only to the modes of expression used in the
28
attract mode and the first few moments of the play mode."'
The Commission's reasons were twofold in not finding infringement of the
play mode.' 2 9 First, allowing copyright protection of the play mode might
protect the game itself or its mode of play, 30 which is specifically not subject
to copyright piotection.'13 While it is true that the mode of play of a board
game (such as Monopoly) is not copyrightable, the same reasoning used in
those cases would not be applicable to a computer program stored in a ROM.
Second, the Commission was troubled by the fact that the player is a coauthor
of the display. While that is a valid problem, it need not be addressed in
determining whether the program stored in the ROM, and the ROM itself,
are capable of obtaining copyright protection. While it is virtually impossible
for a performance of the game display to be duplicated, the program in the
ROM will never change.
The Artic International Case
In Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Artic International, Inc.,' 32 plaintiff
brought suit against defendant for infringement on plaintiff's video game
123. Id. at 856.

124. Id. at 857.
125. Certain Coin-Operated Audio-Visual Games & Components Thereof, 2 COPYRIGHT L.
REP. (CCH) 25,299 (Int'l Trade Comm'n Investigative Report, June 25, 1981).
126. Id., 2 CoPYRaIG-r L. REP. 25,299 at 16,680.
127. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1975).

128. Certain Coin-Operated Audio-Visual Games & Components Thereof, 2 COPYRIGHT L.
REP. (CCH) 25,299 at 16,680 (Int'l Trade Comm'n Investigative Report, June 25, 1981).
129. Id.
130. It is unclear here whether "play mode" and "mode of play" were intended to be the same.
131. In support of this, the Commission cited Affiliated Enter., Inc. v. Gruber, 86 F.2d 958
(1st Cir. 1936); Russell v. Northeastern Pub. Co., 7 F. Supp. 571 (D. Mass. 1934).
132. 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1152 (N.D. Ill.
1981).
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rights. The court, in denying defendant's motion for summary judgment,
stated: "The question of whether fixation occurred and in what tangible
medium of expression, if any, the work was fixed, is a question of material
fact. . . ."' In this decision the copyrightability of a computer program
or of a ROM was not discussed.
The North American Case
In Atari, Inc. v. North American PhilipsConsumerElectronics,3" the district
court denied plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction that would have
prohibited defendant from marketing his K.C. Munchkin video game, which
was similar to the plaintiff's Pac-Man. The parties agreed that the validity
of the copyright was not an issue, and focused on the issue of substantial
similarity between the games. The district court found the alleged infringing
game was not substantially similar to warrant the issuance of a preliminary
finding that parts of the K.C. Munchkin
injunction. The circuit court reversed,
3
game were substantially similar.
The Amusement World Case
In Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, Inc., 3 6 plaintiff sued for infringement of its copyright on the video game Asteroids by defendant's video game
Meteors.' 37 The court found the plaintiff's work was fixed in the medium
of circuitry on a printed circuit board' because it met the statutory definition of a tangible medium of expression.' 39 "A video game's printed circuit
board is clearly such a medium of expression, since the work, the audiovisual
presentation, can be communicated from the printed circuit board with the
aid of the video games' display screen.""" The court, while discussing the
object code, determined that the plaintiff was entitled to a copyright on its
video game,"' but that the similarity between the two games could not be
avoided because of the underlying basic idea, and found that the"defendant's
game did not infringe on plaintiff's copyright." "
The Apple Case
In Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., "' plaintiff alleged
infringement of a copyright of the computer programs stored in his computer.
133. Id. at 1158.
134. 2 COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 1 25,363 (N.D. Il1.1981), rev. and rem. 672 F.2d 607 (71h
Cir. 1982).

135.
136.
137.
138.

2 COPYRIGIT L. REP. (CCH) 25,363 at 17,115.
547 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md. 1981).
Id. at 224.
Id. at 226.

139. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
140. Atari, Inc. v. Amusement World, 547 F. Supp. 222, 226 (D. Md. 1981).

141. Id. at 229.
142. Id.
143. 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa. 1981). This case was a determination of whether to grant
a preliminary injunction. The journal has very little of the actual text reported. One can only
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The programs were in object code and were stored in ROMs. ' The court
stated: "[I]t is not clear the the object code . . . is a language of description," and denied the preliminary injunction." Here the judge developed
several tests similar to the old White-Smith'4 6 legacy. Despite repeated indications from the legislative history,'4 7 statutes,'' and cases,' 4 9 the court still
reasoned that because the object code "was not designed to be 'read' by a
human reader and can only be read by an expert with a microscope,"' 510 it
was not likely that the plaintiff would prevail in the infringement suit. It is
quite obvious from the above authorities that a work does not lose its
copyrightability merely because it may not be read solely by the human eye.
From this court's reasoning, if an author, while writing a book, types the
text into a word processor computer, the book would not be afforded the
same copyright protection that would be available for an author if a conventional typewriter was used.
The court also stated that because the object code cannot teach,' 5 ' it will
probably not be protected by copyright. This reasoning has several obvious
flaws. First, it is nowhere stated that a work must be able to teach to qualify
for copyright protection. Second, the standard used to determine if a work
is capable of teaching is unclear. The average person might learn nothing from
looking at a painting. An artist can look at the same painting and learn a
great deal. The court also stated that the object code is not copyrightable
because it can" control the operation of the computer. This has nothing to
do with copyrightability.
The Williams Case
In Williams Electronic, Inc. v. Artic International,Inc.,' 52 defendant appealed the lower court's decision and issuance of a permanent injunction.' 53
The plaintiff, manufacturer of the video game Defender, obtained copyright
registrations on the computer program, the audiovisual attract mode, and the
audiovisual play mode. 54 The defendant manufactured electronic components,
one of which, when connected to a CRT (cathode ray tube or television tube),
produced a display identical to the plaintiffs Defender.' 5 5
hope that what was reported was taken out of context and does not mean what is indicated.
If this what the court meant to base its decision on, it is hoped that the attorneys will inform
the court, or jury, more accurately wvhen the case is determined on its merits.
144. Id. at 815.
145. Id.at 821.
146. White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
147. HousE REPORT, supra note 4.
148. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (Supp. IV 1980).
149. Tandy Corp. v. Personal Micro Computers, Inc., 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
150. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 545 F. Supp. 812, 821 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
151. Id.
152. 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982).
153. Id.at 871.
154. Id. at 872.
155. Id.
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The defendant argued that there was a lack of fixation because the game
created new images each time the attract mode or play mode was displayed.
This theory was rejected by the circuit court, following the district court's
reasoning, 1 6 which stated that the fixation requirement was met whenever
a work was "sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be... reproduced,
7
or othcrwise communicated for more than a transitory period."'5
Defendant next contended that while the source code may be protected,
the object code may not be protected because a computer program stored
in the ROM did not satisfy the statutory requirement of fixation in a material
object. A copy must be intelligible to human beings and intended as a medium
of communication to human beings to be fixed in a material object.' 8 Thus,
once again the legacy of White-Smith raised its ugly head, but was rejected
by an appellate court. The court, considering the statutory definition of a
copy, 5 9 stated that the broad language adopted by Congress was meant to
encompass technological advances such as those represented by electronic
devices'6: "We cannot accept defendant's suggestion that would afford an
unlimited loophole by which infringement of a computer program is limited
to copying of the computer program text but not to duplication of a computer program fixed on a silicon chip."' 6' Thus, an appellate court has now
properly determined that an object code, and a ROM, are copyrightable works.
Conclusion
It is clear from these authorities that ROMs should be considered
copyrightable. It is evident that to deny copyright protection to ROMs would
breach basic policies and principles behind copyright law. Copyright is intended to encourage production of original works of lasting benefit to the
world.' 2 The Supreme Court, in Mazer v. Stein,"3 stated that the economic
philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant copyright is "the
conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the
best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts'.' 6 By not allowing ROMs to be copyrighted,
the courts would force authors and inventors to rely on trade secrets to protect their works. This would have an effect opposite to that sought to be
accomplished by the copyright statutes.
It is also clear from Congress' recent statutory amendments and legislative

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

See supra text accompanying note 118.
Williams Electronic, Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 874 (3d Cir. 1982).
Id. at 876.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. IV 1980).
Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 877 (3d Cir. 1982).
Id.
Washington Pub. Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 36 (1939).
347 U.S. 201 (1954).
Id. at 219.
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history that computer programs (and hence, ROMs) are subject to copyright
protection. Two recent amendments to the Copyright Act' 65 indicate that
copyright protection is available for computer programs. The definition of
"computer program" added to the Act would include a ROM in "a set of
statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in
order to bring about a certain result."' 6 This would include ROMs because
a ROM has encoded in it a set of instructions to be used by a computer.
Although merely a definition, Congress seems to have intended to include
ROMs under the Act. Another recent amendment 67 clearly indicates that computer programs (and ROMs) are covered by the Act. This statute's title, "Limits
on exclusive rights: Computer programs," indicates that computer programs
are treated as copyrightable works, or there would otherwise be no need to
limit the rights affecting them.
For the ROM to be copyrightable, it need only be fixed and an original
work of authorship. In determining whether it is an original work, the same
reasoning should be used as is standard in copyright cases-that it has not
been copied and that it is not just an idea. Although the question of fixation
is still being argued with respect to computer programs, such programs have
been allowed copyright protection.
If the cases that find computer programs copyrightable works are limited
to the source program, the object code in the ROMs would still be protected
as derivative works.' 6 The object code, being a mere translation of the source
program, would be protected by the author's exclusive right to prepare
derivative works based on the copyrighted material.'69 As stated in the statute,
a derivative work is "a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such
as a translation .

. .

. or any other form in which a work may be recast,

transformed, or adapted."'7 0 Just as the translation of a book from English
to French would be protected, so would a translation from FORTRAN to
COBOL, or from a source program to an object code.'7 '
Thus, by this reasoning the object code may be considered an original work
of authorship fixed in the ROM, which is a tangible medium of expression.
As a result, an object code would be protected either as an original work
or as a derivative work, and a ROM should then be protected as being a
"tangible medium of expression" of the object code.
Raymond J. Warren

165. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. IV 1980) added a definition of "Computer Program," and 17
U.S.C. § 117 (Supp. IV 1980) added limitations on exclusive rights of computer programs.
166. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. IV 1980).
167. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (Supp. IV 1980).
168. 17 U.S.C. § 103 (Supp. IV 1980).
169. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (Supp. IV 1980).
170. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (Supp. IV 1980).
171. Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1012 (N.D.
Tex. 1978).
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